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IS THIS REALLY
NECESSARY?
New Year's Resolutions for the
Legislature: A Consumer Manifesto
While listing my annual New Year's
resolutions several months ago, I realized that it is actually easier to formulate lists for others. I am saved the guilt
of ignoring my own through the rest of
the year and can chastise others, which
is somehow more satisfying. In this spirit,
and a bit belatedly, we list ten 1988 New
Year's resolutions for the California
State Legislature.
1. We Shall Not Let Personal
Disputes Influence Our Decisions.
Sound obvious? Then you don't
know Sacramento very well. It is most
amazing how many legislators take affront at the actions of other legislators,
whether due to failure to support one
for a committee post, or an offhand
sarcastic remark on the Capitol elevators. Legislators are gregarious-and
they work in a quid pro quo world of
bartering. One legislator may become
angry at another for the way he/she has
treated a legislative or pork barrel
project. These emotional reactions are
natural and understandable.
However, our state legislators manifest these feelings overwhelmingly in
their official duties. A legislator who is
chair of a critical subcommittee whose
own bills were not passed summarily
through the committee of another legislator will block that legislator's bills. A
bill sponsored by a legislator who offended a key committee chair will get short
shrift. These dispositions of public legislation are not made with reference to
their merit. Rather, the bills are considered a kind of neutral and empty
currency, a means of rewarding or punishing those who may have caused offense.
The significance of the bill lies in
who wants it passed and who doesn't;
and how one feels about those persons.
The content of the bill becomes irrelevant. This "I'm going to block his bills
because of what he did to me eight
months ago" mentality is not an occasional flaw of an aberrant legislator. It is
common.

2. We Shall Not Vote On Bills Based
On "Nose Counting," But Shall
Actually Try To Read And Understand Them.
Another simple one? Hardly. Most
bills are proposed and drafted by agency
officials or private interest groups, not
by legislators. For each bill that is proposed, a separate file is kept. One of the
chief jobs of the legislator-"sponsor" is
to gather the endorsement of organizations in support of the bill. It is disturbing how many legislators vote for or
against a bill simply by counting the
noses of those who have endorsed or
who are on record as opposing it. This
"nose counting" method of decisionmaking is the norm rather than the exception in Sacramento. Understandably,
legislators are caught up in the rush of a
great deal of legislation considered in a
short period of time. Nevertheless, they
should take the time to read the bills
(many of which are not lengthy), attempt
to understand the impact the legislation
will have substantively on the public,
and ask independently-derived and poignant questions at hearings.
There are over 500 active lobbyists
in Sacramento. Most profit-stake groups
and institutions in the state are organized. Those who do not have a direct
profit stake in public policy, i.e., the
taxpayer, the environment, children,
future interests, and the very diffuse
general public, are underrepresented.
Less than a dozen individuals in Sacramento even purport to represent these
broad, diffuse interests. Legislators are
elected to represent those broad interests
and commonly abdicate that responsibility; they simply count noses of those
who are already organized around a
profit stake in public policy to determine
their votes.
A typical conversation, not only
among legislators, but among the Governor's staff in considering vetoes, commonly involves the following colloquy:
Q. "How come you guys are the only
ones opposing this bill if it so bad?"
A. "Have you read the bill?" Q. "But I
don't understand, you're the only ones

opposing it." A. "Have you read the
bill?" Q. "I don't understand how these
other groups could be supporting it if
it's such a bad bill?" A. "Have you read
the bill? Can we discuss what the bill
would do for at least three minutes?"
Q. "I just don't understand why you just
don't get together with those proposing
the bill and work it out."
This "let's count noses," and, if someone really dissents, "why don't you guys
go out in the hall, work it out, and
come back?" attitude results in legislation determined in vector-like fashion
by those with a profit-stake interest,
with the greatest influence by those with
the greatest profit stake. Everyone who
is there works out a deal to take the
maximum amount from those who are
not there. And who is not there? Probably you, dear reader.
3. Our Committee Votes Will Be
Accountable, Public, And Published.

Certainly the prerequisite to any
effective democratic system is accountability. It is not enough that people
have the right to vote for the candidates;
they must have good information about
what those candidates do in office in
order to judge their performance. Without such information, elections become
a charade.
Most of the critical decisions in our
Legislature are made at the committee
level. The decision where to assign a
bill, the scheduling decisions of the committee chair, amendments to the bill,
and the votes of the committee members
occur at this level. In order to pass
through a committee of the Legislature,
a bill must be supported by the majority
of the members of the committee, not a
majority of a quorum present at a particular hearing. Hence, on an elevenmember committee, the bill must receive
six affirmative votes. Legislators belong
to more than one committee. They could
be involved in three or four different
committees, with meetings often in conflict. If legislators wish to vote against
a bill, their most common recourse is
simply not to show up for that committee's vote. "Taking a walk," instead
of voting, is commonplace in Sacramento. Hence, if one's bill needs two or
three affirmative votes, one may be unable to find the legislators to achieve the
majority vote. Why should a legislator
vote "no" on a bill and perhaps offend
someone when he/she can ambiguously
"take a walk?"
Exacerbating this trait is the tendency not to publicize the committee votes
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which do occur. Who voted yes, who
voted no, and who did not vote for each
bill, is not a readily accessible piece of
information. It is gathered in the Senate
and Assembly Journals, but journalists
do not seem to be making wide use of it.
The Legislature, which passed a series
of "sunshine" bills requiring the executive branch of government to be open to
the public (requiring open meetings and
the disclosure of all public documents)
has largely exempted itself from these
provisions. How about routine press releases on major committee votes, including who voted how?
4. We Shall Attempt To Do Something
About Fragmentation In The Boundaries Of Assembly And Senate
Districts, And Of Our Local
Government Jurisdictions.
The Legislature is aware that every
single incumbent legislator running for
reelection in 1986 was reelected. There
were very few close races-the average
race involving a victory by more than
two to one. The redistricting power must
be taken away from the legislature, and
given to a quasi-judicial commission to
establish equitable and competitive district boundaries.
And legislative district boundaries
are not the only problem. Local government in California is hopelessly fragmented. County and city boundaries
look like ink blots on the map, with city
territories extending five miles down
one-hundred-yard-wide corridors to capture viable tax property in a blob at the
end. City boundaries run down the middle of streets, with addresses running up
on one side and down on the othergoing in the same direction. Los Angeles
County has more than 350 special districts, most with their own boundaries,
many with their own elected bodies governing them. This local government complexity is further complicated by a mix
of fire, police, water, sewage, and utility
jurisdictions.
The legislative district and local government boundaries should be drawn so
the jurisdictions have a natural center
and compact shapes defining areas where
there is a sense of commonality and
community. Preferably, these visible
local governments would absorb fragmented special districts into multipurpose jurisdictions. Elective accountability means that the voters know not
only what their elected officials are
doing, but who they are. Special districts
can keep geographic unique boundaries
for financing purposes where assessments benefit only those within small
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areas, but the notion of basic and wholesale government services devolved into
scores of separate decisionmaking units
for purposes of governance impedes real
democracy.
5. We Shall Support, And Indeed Enact,
Common Cause's Campaign Finance
Iniative Of 1988.
It is no surprise to our current legislators that they have a 20 or 30 to I
ratio in campaign contributions vis-a-vis
their challengers. The cost of elections
has skyrocketed, and even though incumbents have no statistical reason to
fear defeat, they perceive the need for
substantial campaign contributions.
(Perhaps it is like the common fear of
flying, notwithstanding its statistically
superior safety record.) Most campaign
funding comes from political action
committees associated with interests
vying for favor before the Legislature.
It is true that campaign contributions
do not dictate all legislators' votes. But
they have a mighty influence. At the
very least, campaign contributions guarantee enhanced access to a legislator.
Access, particularly where an issue is in
its gestation .tage, is critical to effective
influence. Obtaining an early commitment from a legislator because of that
access often ensures a compliant vote,
since our officials are predictably hesitant to back off from a publicly stated
position.
The public increasingly perceives the
Legislature as "bought." In reality it is
not that simple, but campaign contributors again and again are able to persuade a legislator to "take a walk," as
described above, in critical committee
deliberations where affirmative votes are
necessary for passage. Campaign contributions do, in fact, determine the outcome of large numbers of votes on legislation. And they operate in extremis for
party leaders who covet campaign contributions to dole out to other candidates for political power.
One reprehensible popular game is
referred to by the few consumer advocates as "bill hijacking." Common
enough to warrant its own terminology,
a powerful legislator will rejoice when a
pro-consumer bill is proposed. Indeed,
he/she will announce immediate support
for it and try to sign on as sponsor.
He/she will then use this standing as
sponsor and the bill's threat to profitstake interests to extract campaign contributions. The contributions are made
so the legislator will eviscerate his/her
own falsely-claimed cause. Cynical? You
bet. Some legislators have become so
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focused on money they have forgotten
why they're there. They begin to think
the end result is influence qua influence-not a substantive body of law.
The Common Cause-sponsored initiative now before the voters probably will
pass by an overwhelming margin. Rather
than having the people jam ethical government down its throat, it would be
nice for the Legislature to do it to itself.
This might give the challengers an opportunity to raise some campaign finances
through publicly funded contributions.
It also might mean that legislators will
have to forego huge contributions from
individual special interests in order to
receive these matching public funds.
(See CRLR Vol. 7, No. I (Winter 1987)
pp. 9-11 for complete details on the
Common Cause initiative.)
This proposition, interestingly backed
by academics, consumer groups, labor,
and even substantial business interests
(who say privately they are tired of being
"shaken down" for huge sums of money
every two years), will make an enormous
difference in the quality of government.
Incumbents will know they may be challenged and that their record may be
examined as never before. A few of
them might even be defeated. They
would also know that they could mount
a campaign against even a wealthy challenger without selling out to profit-stake
interests for a comparable campaign
fund; the matching formula greatly reduces reliance on private contributions.
It will end directly the perpetual campaign fundraising of legislative leaders
so they can give to the campaigns of
their favored candidates. These funds
are fed substantially by special interests,
and magnify the corruptive influence of
those interests on the Legislature.
The Legislature believes that the public does not like the idea of using taxpayer monies to finance these often
tasteless campaigns. But it underestimates the average Californian. Taxpayers don't like the idea of financing
boring sloganeering or dishonest campaigns, but they like even less their
financing by those with narrow interests,
and the resulting disproportionate influence on the enactment of public statutes.
The California citizen is sophisticated
enough to want to spend one or two
percent of taxpayer monies to make sure
the other 98% or 99% is spent rationally
and fairly. That is a very good investment indeed.
These are pretty big items, but they
hardly exhaust our resolution list for
the Legislature. One might add the passage of Senator Marks' bill to prohibit
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former state officials from lobbying their
old agencies for twelve months after
departure. Basic reforms are needed to
strengthen the independence of the statebecause the most important check in the
American system is not the executivelegislative-judicial division, but the separateness and neutrality of the state as it
represents the "people" in the broadest
sense.
In addition to these structural reforms, the Legislature should focus attention on numerous areas of legislative
policy needing alteration. For example:
6. We Shall Amend The Administrative
Procedure Act To Provide For Fair
Entry And Effective Discipline By
Our Regulatory Agencies, And To
Bar As An Agency Official Any
Person With A Current Vested Profit
Stake In That Agency's Business.
The entry decisions made by many
licensing agencies are disgraceful. The
Board of Accountancy approves CPA
status sometimes for under 10% of exam
takers. Does anybody know how hard it
is to become a veterinarian, thanks largely to school barriers to entry-smilingly
tolerated by the Vet Board? Has the
Legislature noticed that some twelve
law schools have a 0% Bar exam passage
rate?
The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) requires an agency processing
someone's application to prepare a "statement of issues" (if petitioned to do so)
to notify the applicant where he/she is
deficient. A right to a brief hearing then
follows-with the burden on the applicant to show admission conditions have
been satisfied. The problem? The statute
contains no time limits for response or
hearing by the agency.
Hence, agencies such as the Board of
Medical Quality Assurance (BMQA)
(which, for seemingly racist reasons,
declines to license Vietnamese candidates who have scored at high levels in
qualifying tests and internship performance) abuse their discretion. A request
for such a statement of issues and hearing will receive no reply-for months
and years on end. Where abuses occur
which are as egregious as those now
being perpetrated by BMQA, and which
have serious civil rights overtones,
administrative abuse should not only be
checked by reasonable time limits, but
should also include legislative power to
compel the removal of public officials
who flout legislative purpose. These statutes are enforced by officials in whom
the Legislature has reposed a high degree
of trust. A broad enabling statute dele-

gates critical authority to officials to
carry out legislative intent. Where the
officials exhibit repeated contempt for
that intent, the Legislature should have
the power not only to alter the statute,
but to remove those officials. In the case
of the Board of Medical Quality Assurance, such removal of several Board
members and top administrators is long
overdue.
In the area of discipline, the APA is
also inadequate. It is clumsy, costly, and
difficult to effectuate. The revocation of
a license issued by the state of California-whether that of a pharmacist,
accountant, or barber-is a serious
matter. Abuses committed by these licensees may be serious, and the removal
or suspension of their means of livelihood is also serious. Both of these interests require due process. However, the
current APA process for disciplinary
adjudications involves repeated proceedings, excessive opportunity for political
factors or the proclivities of currently
practicing tradespersons to intrude into
an adjudication, and overwhelming expense. These disciplinary steps must be
streamlined and reformed. Revisions
roughly analogous to the reforms which
are currently being implemented by the
State Bar and which prove successful in
its sui generis system should be considered for adoption by all agencies
through an amended APA.
It may surprise some Californians to
know that the APA does not prohibit
agency governance by part-time officials
with a current vested profit stake in the
agency's business. In fact, such a conflict
of interest is not only allowed, it is
requiredby statute. It is fine for a trade
to form an advisory group-perhaps
with official status. It can offer expert
views to supplement expert staff help.
But the public decisionmakers acting for
the state should represent the public and
have no such tie. Adjudications to deny
or revoke a license should not be made
by a group of fellow tradespersons.
Rulemaking and policy decisions about
entry into the trade-which may restrain
trade for the profit-benefit of the trade
and be contrary to consumer and public
interest-similarly should not be in the
hands of the trade. This is all obvious
ninth-grade civics. Our government must
be independent, as we noted above. The
APA should require it.
7. We Shall Terminate Those Regulatory Boards And Commissions
Which Are Not Necessary, And
Shall Compel Those Which Are
Necessary To Regulate Effectively.

The Legislature has traditionally allowed most any group of tradespeople to
get together and form its own agency,
funded through special assessment of its
members. No money is spent from the
General Fund, and nobody opposes it,
particularly if the agency is formed in
the name of "consumer protection."
Most of these agencies, however, are
not formed by those with consumer
rights foremost in their minds (notwithstanding their assurances at the time of
formation), and the financing of these
agencies is an indirect tax paid for by
the public which uses the services profferred.
Legislators must develop a theory of
regulation-a set of minimum criteria
which must be met before the state will
intervene in the marketplace. These criteria must include an analysis and conclusion that the marketplace is deficient
and that the proposed regulatory scheme
will address that deficiency narrowly
and effectively. Such elementary analyses
have not accompanied regulatory proposals in the past.
Senator Boatwright has introduced
legislation which would eliminate or consolidate six boards. These bills should
be enacted. The agencies involved, such
as the Board of Landscape Architects,
cover trades which do not require state
licensing. The prior restraint bar from a
trade or profession is an extreme regulatory measure. Rather than letting the
marketplace regulate who is chosen to
perform what service, government makes
an in-advance decision based on its evaluation of who should be allowed. This
momentous exercise of state power
should be undertaken only where there
is clear justification for it. Usually that
justification involves an estimate of
"irreparable harm," which other societal
means cannot address if there is incompetence in that profession or trade. The
licensing system focuses on the prevention of such incompetence in order to
preclude that irreparable harm.
Critics argue that most boards and
commissions have become fond of entry
barriers to prevent "incompetence" but
are very hesitant to excise practitioners
who prove to be incompetent post-licensure. Indeed, very few regulatory agencies
have a defensible record in the revocation of the licenses of those who are
demonstrably incompetent, although
that function is the raison d'etre for
their existence.
BMQA, for example, brazenly blocks
entry to qualified physicians while lying
moribund in discipline. Its constituent
groups issue deceitful press releases
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about excessive malpractice awards,
while it delegates the power to restrict
licenses to private groups (such as hospitals and professional specialty boards),
and jerks very few licenses. The most
aggressive activities of this sorry Board
include a drug and alcohol diversion
program which immunizes hundreds of
substance-abusing physicians from license suspension, and a debilitating
"Ben Casey" mentality which forces interns and residents into 20-hour shifts
and little sleep as a kind of "we had to
go through it so here's your boot camp
too."
For many boards, such as the Board
of Landscape Architects or the recentlyterminated Board of Fabric Care, the
person purchasing the services does not
need an "assurance of competence" by
the state. The need for repeat business
allows the marketplace to purge the incompetent without the intervention of
the state. Nor do those who hire petroleum engineers or golf course architects
really need the state to tell them who is
competent.
We should be hesitant to regulate a
profession or trade-particularly where
the regulation involves prior restraint
licensing. But if we do find that there is
serious and repeated irreparable harm
where there are incompetent practitioners, then-really regulate. Accomplish
what is in fact our stated purpose for
government intrusion. Direct that intrusion at the abuse which justifies it. At
present, the Legislature allows far too
much licensing, and where that licensing
is clearly justified, allows it to perpetuate
a great deal of incompetent practice.
8. We Resolve To Enact Statutes To
Preclude The Unfettered Granting
Of Local Monopolies By Local
Governments.
Years ago, the Legislature wisely
adopted a statute which prohibits any
local government from engaging in a
major public project (over $5,000) without competitive bidding. The reason is
obvious: we cannot allow local government officials, particularly in the fragmented structure described above, to
give out huge private construction projects and other favors without some form
of market check. The alternative to such
a check is inevitable payoffs and corruption.
A new area of favor dispensation
has arisen that the Legislature has
missed. In addition to giving out construction contracts and other awards for
large "public projects," local govern-
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ment is increasingly able to give out
even much more lucrative "exclusive
franchises." An entrepreneur may operate a permitted monopoly in a sector of
business. For example, a local jurisdiction can declare not only residentialbut even the normally competitive commercial-trash hauling industry to be
subject to an "exclusive franchise" in its
territory. Nobody but the private firm it
chooses may operate-even if there is
no "natural monopoly" requiring only
one entrepreneur. In the area of cable
television, local jurisdictions can (with
some free speech right limitation) set up
a system which allows only one entrepreneur in an area. They can do the same
in the area of stadium authority concessions, ambulance services, and other
areas where "privatization" is possible.
This power of local government to set
up such a monopoly is momentous. It is
the opportunity for perpetual unmonitored excessive profits.
Without competitive bidding or other
market check, these monopolies are an
open invitation to corrupt local officials
in their award. And many of these local
monopolies collect money. The collection of these monies is usually subject to
a "franchise fee" going to that local
government. Hence, the post-Proposition 13 revenue needs of a local jurisdiction may be accommodated through
high franchise fees on excessively priced
monopoly services.
In a series of unfortunate decisions,
the federal courts have allowed very
broad state enabling statutes to justify
the delegation of the power to grant
monopoly franchises without any meaningful check. A statute should be enacted which allows local jurisdictions a
wide variety of options, even where they
have their own proprietary interests in
the enterprise. However, that statute
should not allow for the granting of
exclusive franchises without either
competitive bidding or meaningful rate
regulation. There should be no "free
lunch" plum worth many millions of
dollars to be allocated by local officials;
the result is commercial abuse and incentive for local government corruption.
A state statute should require, in the
context of any exclusive franchise, meaningful specifications and competitive bidding for such a franchise for a reasonably
short period of time (e.g., no more than
five years) and/or PUC-type rate regulation. Rate regulation should require cost
justification, rate base or investment
calculation, and the fixing of rates based
on a fair rate of return given the risk
and comparable profits in the private
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sector. If it is difficult to fashion a general statute, specific statutes should be
so fashioned in trash hauling, cable television, and other areas where current
abuse has already been demonstrated.
9. We Shall Reform Proposition 13.
It is understandable that the people
of California wanted to impose some
kind of restraint on the seemingly endless increase in property taxes to feed
local government bureaucracy. The concept of a 1% maximum limit on taxation
of real property value is eminently defensible. And, indeed, it should be
defended against the current trickery
of local governments to exceed those
amounts. However, this is an ad
valorem tax; that is, it is a tax on the
value of something. Each person is taxed
a percentage of the market value of real
property assets located in California.
But the way Proposition 13 was drafted
(incompetently drafted California propositions are a prevalent problem), the
calculation of value is inequitably applied. This is not a small complaint
about fringe effects; it goes to the heart
of our basic equal protection concepts.
You have two houses sitting side by
side. They are identical, perhaps even
tract homes. They were both built at the
same time and have the exact same
market value. Except the owner in house
#1 has been there since 1972 and the
owner of house #2 just bought last year.
Because the "market value" under the
terms of Proposition 13 is set substantially based on the most recent market
sale, the buyer of house #2 will probably
pay four times the property taxes as the
owner of house #1. The owner of house
#1 receives an enormous tax subsidy
from other taxpayers simply because of
the time when his home was purchased.
Both owners receive the basic same city
services for their tax monies. Such a
variation based on the time of purchase,
and unrelated to the market value of the
property, violates fundamental tax equity and equal protection concepts. The
California Supreme Court had an opportunity to redress this grievance, but
succumbed to either illogic or political
vagaries and refused to do so.
10. We Shall Reform The Insurance
System of California.
The insurance industry and the trial
lawyers are two of the most powerful
lobbies in Sacramento. Either one of
them seems capable of stopping any
legislative measure which they oppose.
It is time to pass a measure both would
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oppose in the interests of the citizens of
California.
We now have mandatory auto insurance, and it has passed muster in the
courts. Because of "red lining" or perhaps economics, poorer Californians are
going to have to pay anywhere from
$800 to $2,000 for required minimum
coverage for a single automobile. They
will have to pay such rates or they will
be committing a criminal offense if they
drive a car. It is difficult or impossible
to hold a job or live in California, given
its land use and transportation systems,
without a car.
We all know that the majority of
monies obtained from personal injury
litigation goes to attorneys. And it is
not just plaintiff attorneys working on
contingency fees; attorneys for insurance
firms bill at $80 to $150 per hour and
collect a mighty sum. And the insurance
firms themselves take a healthy cut for
claims adjusters, sales costs, advertising, etc.
We have proposed a "no lawyer"
auto insuranceplan to provide this minimum required insurance. It would operate on a no-fault basis and award basic
property and medical damage recompense to those who most need it-the
injured. There would be a much lower
transaction cost in awarding these coststhey would be made by an agency after
an efficient investigation. No insurance
administrative costs, claims adjustments,
defense counsel, or plaintiff contingency
fee award. Maybe even fewer obnoxious
plaintiff personal injury attorney television ads-no small side benefit.
The recompense would be quick and
much less costly. If an accident has been
caused by gross negligence causing damage well above the minimum limits, there
could still be a lawsuit and "overage"
insurance. But there is no reason to
contaminate insurance costs all of us
must now pay if we drive a vehicle. This
system, according to experts, could cost
no more than $300 per year per car-a
manageable sum for most California
citizens.
Most accidents do not involve huge
amounts of damage and are redressable
under the system outlined. Most people
do not engage in accidents for the fun of
it, and the government inquiry should
be sufficient to prevent fraud on the
public fund created. And, indeed, where
there is such fraud against a public fund,
criminal prosecution would be more likely by public prosecutors.
Now that we have offended the trial
lawyers, let's offend the insurance industry. Insurance firms are exempt from

antitrust law at both the federal and
state levels. The state insurance commissioners have done virtually nothing
in the area of rate regulation over the
past twenty years. Hence, insurance
firms are in the unique position of not
having their rates examined on a fair
rate of return basis, and at the same
time are able to collude and fix prices,
or engage in other antitrust violations
(within certain limits) without private or
public check. There should be no free
lunch for the insurance companies either.
Insurance rates are obviously excessive by any competitive measure. Insurers spend a great deal of their time
openly engaging in lies about "runaway
juries" in cases where those they insure
have ruined lives or threatened the public health through egregious behavior.
The Legislature should bite the bullet
here also, and remove the antitrust exemption for the insurance industry, as
recommended by distinguished panels
under both Democratic and Republican
administrations at the federal level.
After removing that exemption, the
Insurance Commissioner should be compelled to engage in rate regulation on a
logical basis. This would involve the
following procedure: the insurance commissioner is required to make a finding
of fact that there is "effective competition" for each line of insurance sold in
California. This "finding of fact" is
based on an investigation by the Department and, if challenged, should be the
subject of an evidentiary hearing. "Effective competition" requires the findings
that (1) there has been no collusion between those setting rates affecting that
line of insurance in California; (2) there
are more than three such carriers providing that line of insurance in any relevant geographic market within the state;
and (3) there is no evidence of rate discrimination violating existing standards.
After that determination has been
made, or if tested, after initial hearing
which validates that finding, the rates as
established by the insurance companies
will stand as proposed by them. As to
the lines of insurance where the Insurance Commissioner is unable to make a
finding that there is effective competition, he/she will then be obligated by
law to set rates according to PUC-type
"fair rate of return" procedures.
This system is simple: either set your
rates by market competition, or subject
yourself to rate regulation to substitute
for an absent marketplace. But you can't
have it both ways-and insurance firms
have had it both ways for far too long.
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